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Abstract: The explosive development of  “free” or “open source” information 
goods contravenes the conventional wisdom that markets and commercial 
organizations are necessary to efficiently supply products. This paper proposes a 
theoretical explanation for this phenomenon, using concepts from economics and 
theories of self-organization. Once available on the Internet, information is 
intrinsically not a scarce good, as it can be replicated virtually without cost. 
Moreover, freely distributing information is profitable to its creator, since it 
improves the quality of the information, and enhances the creator’s reputation. 
This provides a sufficient incentive for people to contribute to open access 
projects. Unlike traditional organizations, open access communities are open, 
distributed and self-organizing. Coordination is achieved through stigmergy: 
listings of “work-in-progress” direct potential contributors to the tasks where their 
contribution is most likely to be fruitful. This obviates the need both for 
centralized planning and for the “invisible hand” of the market. 
 
 
1. Introduction 
The last few years have witnessed a surprisingly quick and successful spread of 
“free”, “libre”, “open access”, “open content” or “open source” information products. 
In this paper, I will skip the interesting but sometimes complicated differences 
between the precise forms of distribution that are associated with these terms, and 
focus on their common characteristic, which is that these products are not proprietary: 
they are not “owned” by a particular individual or organization who has the sole 
rights to distribute them. They are a part of the “creative commons” that everyone can 
freely access, use, and—in many cases—modify. I will also ignore the differences 
between different media or intended applications (such as text, images, music, or 
software), but focus on their common characteristic, which is that they consist purely 
of information that can be duplicated without limit. As shorthand, I will designate 
them all as “open access”. 
Complex software applications, websites, journals and magazines, books, pictures,  
“podcasts”, video recordings and even whole encyclopedias have been made 
accessible by their authors to everyone, for consultation, use and even modification, 
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and this without cost or restriction. Perhaps the best known examples are the Linux1 
operating system (Moody, 2002), which is starting to compete with Microsoft 
Windows to become the standard on which computers run, Wikipedia2, an 
international web encyclopedia, that is already the largest one in existence (Lih, 
2004), ArXiv3 and other Internet paper archives where thousands of scientists make 
their results freely available before they are published in proprietary journals (Hajjem 
et al. 2005), and finally the World-Wide Web itself, a collection of communication 
protocols and software applications for the transparent distribution of hypermedia 
documents across the Internet (Berners-Lee, 1999).  
These developments are revolutionizing our society. On the one hand, they put into 
question one of the foundations of the present-day market economy, the idea that 
intellectual property is necessary to stimulate innovation. On the other hand, they 
open up huge opportunities, which include: freely providing software, technical 
know-how, scientific knowledge and general education to the countries and people 
that need it most, but can least afford to pay for it; empowering and stimulating 
ordinary people to be intellectually creative and thus help others; reducing the danger 
of commercial monopolies that control software standards or news distribution; and 
creating and distributing information much more quickly and widely than before, 
when it is needed and where it is needed.  
While this development clearly rests on the Internet, it was largely overlooked in the 
recent past of the ‘dot-com bubble’, when pundits were focusing on the great 
opportunities for commercial exploitation of the net (Howcroft, 2001). With the 
advent of the web and its multimedia capabilities for information delivery, most 
experts were wondering how the big corporations such as ABC or Time-Warner 
would be able to produce enough “content” to satisfy the huge surge in demand for 
information that the web would bring along. Presently, the web users themselves are 
producing the “content”, in millions of blogs and wikis, providing news, opinion, 
entertainment and information, at a fraction of the cost that the corporations were 
planning to invest. 
This development was less surprising to the pioneers of the World-Wide Web (among 
which I count myself, having developed the complex Principia Cybernetica website4 
already in 1993, cf. Heylighen, 1994). Before the advent of commercial interests on 
the Internet, the reigning culture among its users was one of freedom, cooperation and 
sharing, not of competition and exclusion. The early Internet users were mostly 
researchers, who found it obvious that they would make the results of their efforts 
publicly available, without demanding any money. In that, they merely followed the 
basic philosophy that has made science the most important driver of social, 
technological and economical progress: publish your data and ideas as widely as 
possible, so that others can use them, criticize them, and improve on them.  Before 
1996, basically all information and software on the web was free, but that did not 
seem to deter its producers from being creative, or from releasing additional material 
and improved versions at a breakneck pace.  
                                                
1 http://www.linux.org 
2 http://www.wikipedia.org 
3 http://www.arxiv.org 
4 http://pespmc1.vub.ac.be 
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This free spirit was eclipsed by the dot-com boom (“com” standing for 
“commercial”), where businesses turned en masse to the Internet in the hope of 
making money via advertising, sales or intellectual property rights (Howcroft, 2001). 
The burst of the bubble in 2001 made it clear that moneymaking on the Internet was 
not as easy as people expected. Part of the reason was simply that there was already 
so much available on the web for free: why would you take a complex and expensive 
subscription to the Encyclopaedia Britannica website if you could freely access most 
of that information elsewhere? Of course, that doesn't mean that the Internet cannot be 
used for commercial transactions, as exemplified by highly successful businesses such 
as Amazon.com and eBay. But these function basically as intermediaries for the sales 
of traditional material goods, rather than by selling pure information. 
This evolution suggests that there is something special about the distribution of 
information via the Internet, which contravenes conventional wisdom about 
economics. This paper intends to explore the deeper mechanisms underlying the 
success of open access development and distribution, from the perspective of 
complex, evolving systems. But first we need to analyze in more detail why this 
phenomenon was so surprising to most. 
 
2. Economic theory and open access development 
The classical economics model holds that people are intrinsically selfish, and will not 
do anything to help others—such as providing information products—without 
remuneration. Traditional economics is based on the assumption that private property 
rights are needed as an incentive for production. Only when you have full control over 
your production can you ask remuneration for it to the people who would like to use 
it. Moreover, the free market model assumes that competition is needed to optimize 
production: if people do not buy your products because they prefer the one of your 
competitors, you will be forced to improve your products or lower their price. When 
the major producers all cooperate, as in a cartel, competition is eroded and prices can 
increase freely without corresponding increase in quality.  
At first sight, all these economic principles are contravened by the open access 
community  (cf. Lerner & Tirole, 2002): people produce information or software for 
free, allow others to use it as they please, and all work together on major enterprises 
such as Linux or Wikipedia. Yet, this community has produced better products, in a 
shorter time span, and at a lower cost, than specialized private enterprises that have 
been in the business for decades.  
The paradox becomes even greater when we consider the aspects of organization and 
control. According to theory, the major advantage of a free market economy over a 
plan-based economy is coordination: a centralized planning institute can never collect 
and process all the information needed to decide what to produce when and where; a 
free market, on the other hand, functions like an “invisible hand”, that automatically 
allocates the right amount of resources to the production of each commodity that is 
needed (Hayek, 1945). This happens through the law of supply and demand and the 
price mechanism: whenever demand for a good exceeds supply, its price will 
increase, thus enticing suppliers to produce more of that good. In that way, demand 
and supply are automatically balanced by a negative feedback control mechanism, 
without need for complicated planning. 
4 
Institutional economics adds a qualification to the power of market mechanisms, 
though. Its main assumption is that individuals competing in a market will start to 
formally cooperate, thus forming an organization or firm, in order to reduce 
transaction costs (Williamson & Maste, 1995). Transaction costs arise because of the 
need to negotiate and arrange any exchange of goods, services or money. These 
negotiations cost a lot of effort and time, while failing to fully eliminate basic 
uncertainties (is this product or service reliable? are there loopholes in the contract?). 
A firm is based on a set of agreed-upon rules governing the interactions between its 
employees, so as to minimize negotiations and uncertainties. This requires drawing a 
clear boundary between those who belong to the organization (and therefore are 
expected to obey the rules) and those who do not. That also helps to ensure that no 
private information is leaked out of the group, where it could be exploited by 
competitors.  
Whereas regulations may be more reliable than a free market, they are less flexible: 
they cannot adapt automatically to new circumstances. Therefore, the organization 
requires a form of intelligent management to coordinate the activities of the 
employees, and direct them to the most important task at hand. This is normally 
achieved by means of a hierarchical structure, with a CEO or board of directors at the 
top, to plan and control the activity and issue commands down the line to the lower 
levels. This control system moreover must ensure that the employees play according 
to the rules, and do not selfishly exploit the opportunities without giving their due 
effort in return. In other words, the management must thwart the ever-present danger 
of “free riders” by implementing effective punishment when necessary. 
The paradox of the open access community is that it seems to ignore most of these 
organizational principles as well.  In general, anyone can join or leave a given 
community at any moment, and there are no formal members or employees, as 
different people tend to be involved to different degrees. Moreover, the community is 
typically decentralized, without formal, hierarchical structure or punishments for free 
riders. Raymond (1999) has called this loose, self-organizing cooperation model a 
“bazaar”, as contrasted with the “cathedral” model that exemplifies closed, 
centralized, hierarchical organizations. Yet, this distributed coordination cannot rely 
on the market mechanism either, since there are no prices for products to signal where 
demand is greatest. 
In conclusion, open access development not only contravenes common business 
wisdom, but some of the most fundamental assumptions of economic theory. This 
means that we need to develop an alternative theory to explain how open access can 
function.  
 
3. Incentives for information sharing 
A first essential property to note is the non-material nature of information. 
Information is not subjected to the physical constraint of the conservation of matter 
and energy, and therefore to the economic constraint of scarcity: once you have 
gotten a piece of information, such as a computer program, you can multiply and 
distribute it without limit, at virtually no cost. Giving away these copies to others does 
not deprive the original owner. The fact that you use a particular piece of information 
does not in any way preclude somebody else from using the same information at the 
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same time. This property is called non-rivalry in economics (e.g. Martens, 2004). 
While it puts the fundamental economic assumption of scarcity on its head, economic 
theory has as yet little to say about how to deal with non-rival goods (De Long & 
Froomkin, 1998). 
Another important property of information is its partial excludability: while you could 
in principle exclude somebody else from using the same information, e.g. via 
copyright law, patenting or copy protection, the easy replication of information makes 
this prohibition increasingly difficult to implement. This is a problem for traditional 
economics, which assumes that the producer of a good, whether rival or not, needs an 
incentive to continue producing it, and for that must have some means to enforce 
consumers of that good to pay for it (Martens, 2004; De Long & Froomkin, 1998).  
Yet, in open access communities we see a very different structure of incentives. First, 
the non-rivalry of information explains why open access development can function 
with relatively few incentives: assuming that you have the needed resources 
(hardware, software, expertise, time...) to produce a piece of information that you 
want for yourself (e.g. a program, a bibliography, a poem, a photo of your dog…), 
then it hardly costs you more to also make it available to others. Thus, a minor 
investment of your own time such as a hobby, an accidental discovery or a quick 
hack, can nevertheless produce an information good that benefits thousands (cf. 
Ghosh, 1998).  
Although the direct effect is likely to be tiny, this benefit to others may indirectly 
benefit you. Indeed, if the people in your community become a little more efficient, 
productive, or simply happy, because of something you contributed then your own 
life in the community will become better, even if nobody knows that it was you who 
contributed. Thus, the idea of contributing to the community will appeal to the same 
instinct of altruism or “goodness” that makes people give money to charity or do 
volunteer work. This is a first incentive for sharing your information products 
(Weber, 2004). However, while sociobiology and evolutionary psychology (Buss, 
1995) have shown altruism to be a true, genetically based motive, on its own it does 
not seem to be strong enough to support a complex economy, as shown by the free 
rider problem (cf. Heylighen, 2007) and the failure of communism. 
First, we must note that the classical free rider problem does not exist for non-rival 
resources. A free rider is defined as an individual who profits from investments made 
by others but without doing an equivalent effort in return. Most users of open access 
information fall under that category: they utilize products made by others, but 
contribute little or nothing themselves. This apparent “parasitism” or non-reciprocity 
in this case is not a problem, though: the producers do not benefit less from the 
information they produced because others access it too. This already explains why 
open access communities lack the typical controls and penalties that social groups 
throughout history have evolved to discourage profiteering. Moreover, as we are 
about to show, the producers receive benefits that the mere “consumers” fail to get, 
and as such maintain a competitive advantage over free riders. 
So, let us proceed to more selfish motivations for making your work open access. The 
minimal effort of sharing your results with others will be more than compensated for 
by the fact that these others may in turn produce or suggest improvements that benefit 
the creator. For example, your interest in a particular historical figure or geographic 
location may lead you to write down what you know about the subject in a Wikipedia 
article. This article is likely to incite others to add details that you weren’t aware of, 
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thus in turn helping you advance. Moreover, expressing it in an explicit, public form 
is likely to provide you with feedback (which can be as little as someone saying “nice 
work”, or you noticing that the program isn’t used quite as expected). Feedback 
(“reinforcement”) is the basic driver of learning. Thus, even if your actual product is 
not improved by publicizing it, your expertise in producing it may well be. 
If the opportunity of getting a better product and becoming better yourself is not 
enough of an incentive, there is an even stronger motivation for contributing to the 
collective. Indeed, doing so makes you visible within the community, earning you 
recognition for your expertise, activity, and altruism. Psychologists have proposed 
that earning esteem, status, or a good reputation within your community is a 
fundamental human drive (Maslow, 1970). From the point of view of evolutionary 
psychology (Buss, 1995), it is probably even more basic than gaining wealth, since 
during most of (pre)history the person with the highest status in the group would 
anyway get the best access to material resources—in addition to other resources, such 
as mates, friends, help, or information. Surveys have shown that the development of a 
good reputation in the field is indeed a concrete incentive for many open source 
developers (Lerner & Tirole, 2002). 
One of the ways in which these developers can still earn a conventional income is by 
giving away their information products (e.g. software or blogs) for free, but 
demanding a fee for consultancy. Indeed, once complex software is adopted by many 
users, some of these may be willing to pay for help with specific problems by 
consulting the only true experts, namely the ones who wrote the software. Creators of 
literary or artistic content may adopt similar methods. For example, a rock group may 
give away their recordings for free, but once they have established sufficient 
popularity in that way, they can charge people for attending their concerts. Similarly, 
authors or journalists may provide free access to their texts (e.g. blogs), but make 
money by charging for interviews or lectures given to a restricted audience.  
This way of earning money makes more sense than selling access to proprietary 
information, since it focuses on the one thing that effectively becomes more scarce in 
an information society: personal attention (Simon, 1971). Whatever amount of 
information a person makes freely accessible, an important part of his or her expertise 
still remains tacit (Reber, 1993), and therefore not available for easy replication. Such 
intuitive knowledge will only come to the surface when it is used to tackle a particular 
problem or question. Since a person has only a limited time, energy or attention to 
spend on any particular issue, this implicit knowledge does not obey the property of 
non-rivalry or unlimited replicability that characterizes explicit information. 
Therefore, the laws of economics dictate that people will be willing to pay in order to 
get access to the personal attention of an expert.  
However, if you want to sell your advice to others for good money, you will have to 
convince them of your authority in the matter. Here reputation becomes a major 
factor. An even more direct way to get recognition for your expertise is by making its 
products publicly (and preferably freely) available, so that people can judge for 
themselves how good you are. This is much more difficult if you work for a firm, 
since outsiders can only get a dim view of who contributed what within a closed 
organization (cf. Lerner & Tirole, 2002). A similar mechanism is already used in the 
academic world:  scientists’ level of expertise is judged primarily by the quantity and 
quality of their publications, while their eventual income is largely dependent on that 
perceived level of expertise. Research has shown that making a publication open 
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access increases the number of citations it gets, which is the most direct measure of 
the visibility and reputation of its author (Hajjem, Harnad & Gingras, 2005). 
What this system of remuneration still lacks is a way to pay for the initial investments 
that have to be made before one can start to produce useful information. This includes 
hardware, software, Internet access, and education. Happily, all these factors are 
quickly declining in price thanks to on-going progress in information technology. The 
most expensive part, basic education, is provided (nearly) for free in most countries, 
as the burden is being shouldered by society as a whole—which has long ago 
understood that a well-educated workforce is to everybody’s benefit. More advanced 
education typically remains expensive, although scholarships tend to be available for 
those who show most promise (e.g. in the work they have already published). But 
here again, advances in information production, distribution and the open access 
philosophy that tends to go with it, hold the promise that soon educational material for 
any domain will be available for free on the Internet5. 
 
 
4. Self-organization through stigmergy 
To understand the distributed organization that characterizes open access 
development, we can draw inspiration from recent theories of self-organization (e.g. 
Heylighen & Gershenson, 2003) and complex adaptive systems (e.g. Muffatto  & 
Faldani, 2003). A particularly relevant idea, used in the modelling of collective 
intelligence (Heylighen, 1999) and the simulation of swarming behavior (Bonabeau, 
Dorigo & Theraulaz, 1999), is the concept of stigmergy (Susi & Ziemke, 2001). A 
process is stigmergic if the work (“ergon” in Greek) done by one agent provides a 
stimulus (“stigma”) that entices other agents to continue the job.  
This concept was initially proposed to explain how a “bazaar” of dumb, 
uncoordinated termites manage to build their complex, “cathedral-like” termite hills 
(Grassé, 1959). The basic idea is that a termite initially drops a little bit of mud in a 
random place, but that the heaps that are formed in this way stimulate other termites 
to add to them (rather than start a heap of their own), thus making them grow higher 
until they touch other similarly constructed columns. The termites do not 
communicate about who is to do what how or when. Their only communication is 
indirect: the partially executed work of the ones provides information to the others 
about where to make their own contribution. In this way, there is no need for a 
centrally controlled plan, workflow, or division of labor.  
While people are of course much more intelligent than social insects and do 
communicate, open access development uses essentially the same stigmergic 
mechanism (cf. Elliott, 2006, and the simulation by Robles et al., 2005): any new or 
revised document or software component uploaded to the site of a community is 
immediately scrutinized by the members of the community that are interested to use 
it. When one of them discovers a shortcoming, such as a bug, error or lacking 
functionality, that member will be inclined to either solve the problem him/herself, or 
at least point it out to the rest of the community, where it may again entice someone 
else to take up the problem.  
                                                
5 see e.g. http://www.wikibooks.org and http://www.globaltext.org 
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Like stigmergic organization in insects (Bonabeau et al., 1999), the process is self-
reinforcing or autocatalytic (Heylighen, 1999; Heylighen & Gershenson, 2003): the 
more high quality material is already available on the community site, the more 
people will be drawn to check it out, and thus the more people are available to 
improve it further. Thus, open access can profit from a positive feedback cycle that 
boosts successful projects. This explains the explosive growth of systems such as 
Wikipedia or Linux. (A possible disadvantage of such “rich get richer” dynamics is 
that equally valuable, competing projects, because of random fluctuations or sequence 
effects, may fail to get the critical mass necessary to “take off”.) 
While most large-scale open access projects (such as Linux) have one or a few central 
figures (such as Linus Torvalds) that determine the general direction in which the 
project is headed, this control is much less strict than in traditional hierarchical 
organizations. Most of the work is typically performed in a distributed, self-
organizing way. The lack of precise planning is more than compensated for by the 
fact that information about the present state of the project is completely and freely 
available, allowing anyone to contribute to anything at any moment. This provides for 
a much larger diversity of perspectives and experiences that are applied to finding and 
tackling problems, resulting in what Raymond (1999) calls Linus’ Law: “given 
enough eyeballs, all bugs are shallow”. Moreover, since contributors select the tasks 
they work on themselves, they tend to be more interested, motivated and 
knowledgeable about these tasks.  
In this way, open access development fully profits from the evolutionary dynamic of 
variation, recombination and selection (van Wendel de Joode, 2004; Muffatto & 
Faldani, 2003). Openness attracts a greater number and diversity of participants, 
increasing the likeliness of cross-fertilization of their ideas into new combinations. 
This strongly accelerates the variation that is necessary to produce evolutionary 
novelty. This large and diverse community moreover enhances selection, since the 
new ideas will be tested in many more different circumstances, thus systematically 
eliminating the errors and weaknesses that might not have shown in a more 
homogeneous environment. All in all, this leads to greater flexibility, innovation, and 
reliability. 
Stigmergy is more than blind variation and natural selection, though: the visible traces 
of the work performed previously function as a mediator system (Heylighen, 2007), 
storing and (indirectly) communicating information for the community. In that way, 
the mediator coordinates further activity, directing it towards the tasks where it is 
most likely to be fruitful. This requires a shared workspace accessible to all 
contributors (similar to what in AI is called a “blackboard system”). This external 
memory registers which tasks have already been performed and what problems still 
need to be tackled. The Web has provided a very powerful such workspace, since it 
enables the storage and public sharing of any “work-in-progress” information product. 
To better understand the methods used by open access communities, we need to 
further distinguish direct from indirect stigmergy. In direct stigmergy, as exemplified 
by the termite-hill building, it is the “work-in-progress” itself that directs subsequent 
contributions. Indirect stigmergy may be exemplified by the way ants create trails of 
pheromones that direct other ants to food sources. The trails are left as “side-effects” 
of the actual work being performed: finding and bringing food to the nest. Such 
specially created traces may be needed because the task—finding the proverbial 
“needle (food) in the haystack (surroundings)”—is too complex to be performed 
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without detailed clues. Thus, “indirect stigmergy” uses an additional medium for 
information storage. Yet, the coordination achieved in this way still keeps the 
hallmarks of distributed self-organization: the information is addressed to no one in 
particular, and may or may not be picked up by a particular individual at a particular 
moment.  
In open access development, indirect stigmergy can be recognized in forums where 
bugs or feature requests are posted. These forums are themselves not part of the 
information product being developed, but they are regularly consulted by the 
developers, thus attracting their attention to tasks that seem worth performing. The 
problem with such an additional medium is that it adds to the complexity of the (self-
)organization, especially if there is a lot of potentially relevant information posted 
there so that it becomes difficult to establish priorities. Here again we can learn a 
lesson from social insects. The pheromone trails left by ants undergo an efficient form 
of reinforcement learning (Heylighen, 1999): trails that lead to rich food sources will 
be used by many ants and thus amplified, trails that lead to poor or empty sources will 
weaken and eventually disappear. Since ants preferentially follow strong trails, this 
mechanism ensures that the most important tasks or opportunities are tackled first.  
Applied to open access development, this means that we need adaptive mechanisms to 
make the most important requests stand out. An example of such mechanism can be 
found in Wikipedia. When a contributor marks a word as a hyperlink, but there is no 
article discussing this concept yet, an empty page is created inviting other contributors 
to fill in its content. This is direct stigmergy: whenever people look for that concept, 
they are directed immediately to the work that still needs to be done. But when there 
are many thousands of as yet incomplete entries, priorities must be established. Rather 
than having a central committee decide which entries are most important, Wikipedia 
implements a simple form of collective decision-making (cf. Heylighen, 1999): the 
entries that have most hyperlinks pointing to them are listed first in an automatically 
generated list of “most wanted articles”.  
Such a mechanism to display collective demand can be seen as the non-proprietary 
analog of the market. The price mechanism efficiently allocates resources to the 
production of those goods for which demand is highest, by offering the highest 
monetary rewards for them. Similarly, a “most wanted” ordering of requests offers the 
highest probability of recognition for the work performed, or of “good feelings” 
engendered by an altruistic deed. Such stigmergic prioritization is arguably even more 
efficient than a market, since there is no need for the complex and often irrational 
processes of buying, selling, bargaining and speculation that determine the eventual 
price of a commodity—leading to the typically chaotic movements of commodity 
prices on the stock exchange. Moreover, although price could be interpreted as a—
very abstract—stigmergic signal, this variable is merely one-dimensional. On the 
other hand, open access tasks could be ranked on a website according to independent 
stigmergic criteria, such as urgency, difficulty, expected utility, required expertise, 
etc. In that way, potential contributors would be helped in finding the task that suits 
them best. 
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5. Conclusion 
Since the fall of the Soviet Union, the common assumption has been that markets, 
private property rights, and commercial organizations are necessary to efficiently 
produce and distribute products. In addition to the apparent failure of communism, 
this view has been supported by two centuries of economic thought developing 
sophisticated models that purport to show that the market is the optimal way to 
allocate resources. In the last few years, however, the collective development of 
“open access” information products on the Web has emerged like a salient exception 
to this conventional wisdom. The present paper has proposed a theoretical 
justification for this phenomenon. 
First I have noted that the basic economic assumptions of rivalry and excludability are 
not applicable to information shared over the Internet. Once created, information is 
intrinsically not a scarce good, and therefore there is no a priori reason to restrict 
access to it. On the contrary, freely distributing information is likely to profit its 
creator, since it helps to improve the quality of the information, and to enhance the 
creator’s expertise and reputation. Moreover, open access obviously profits everybody 
else, and in particular those who otherwise would be too poor to pay for the 
information. 
I then used the paradigm of self-organization through stigmergy to explain how open 
access development can be efficiently coordinated. Thanks to websites listing “work-
in-progress”, people willing to contribute to the collective development of an 
information product are efficiently directed to the tasks where their contribution is 
most likely to be fruitful. This obviates the need both for centralized planning and 
control, and for the “invisible hand” of the market matching supply to demand.  
These innovations appear fundamental enough to revolutionize our socio-economic 
system (cf. Weber, 2004), offering high hopes for the future, e.g. in stimulating 
innovation, education, democratization, and economic development. While open-
access distribution is not applicable to material resources, their cost as a fraction of 
the total economic cost of any good or service is becoming progressively smaller in a 
society that is ever more heavily dependent on information. Therefore, it could be 
theoretically envisaged that most economic value would eventually be produced 
under an open-access system. To make such a scenario less speculative, we will first 
need to investigate the complex issue of information production that requires 
considerable material investment, such as pharmaceutical research with its expensive 
equipment, where patents and other ways of “closing off” information are rife. The 
issue becomes less daunting, though, if we remember that this kind of research mostly 
builds on publicly funded (and thus normally open access) work.  
To be able to fully compete with the established market-based system, moreover, the 
still very young open access movement will need to further learn from its experiences, 
addressing its remaining weaknesses and building further on its strengths. This will in 
particular require developing better standards and rules, and more powerful software 
solutions for harnessing stigmergy and allocating recognition and feedback—the main 
drivers behind the success of open access according to the present analysis.  
For example, in the Wikipedia system—which otherwise keeps a very detailed track 
of all changes made to all documents by all users—it is impossible at present to get an 
overview of how much a particular user has contributed to the system. Given 
Wikipedia’s versioning system, it should be possible to measure how much of the text 
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entered by a given user survives in the present state of the encyclopedia. This would 
provide a useful measure of both the quantity and the quality of that author’s 
contributions, thus establishing a benchmark by which to measure expertise and 
activity level. Similarly, more advanced algorithms (e.g. inspired by Google’s 
PageRank or Hebbian learning, Heylighen, 1999) could be implemented to organize 
and prioritize tasks. Such intelligent methods for coordinating distributed information 
production could turn the World-Wide Web from merely a collective memory or 
shared workspace into a true “Global Brain” for humanity, that would be able to 
efficiently solve any problem, however complex (Heylighen, 1999, 2004). 
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